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Aleksandr Solzenitzin is famously attributed with the saying ‘Everyone is guilty of 
something or has something to hide. One just has to look hard enough to find it’.2 
Most people manage to keep their guilty secrets precisely that, secret. Youthful 
indiscretions and adult ‘moments of madness’ are normally buried in the past and 
remain there, never to see the light of day again. Such events are viewed as forming 
part of an individual’s private life, and so entitled to the respect enshrined in the 
European Convention of Human Rights.3 Even where proceedings against an 
individual take place in a public forum, such as a conviction in a criminal court, ‘As 
the conviction recedes into the past, it becomes part of the individual’s private life’.4  
 
For a large, and apparently growing,5 number of citizens of England and Wales, 
however, this is not the case, and their mistakes of the past are still coming back to 
haunt them many years after the event. In an attempt to protect the public from those 
with criminal histories who may do the public some harm, whilst preserving respect 
for civil liberties, the UK government created the present system of criminal records 
disclosure.6 The system has been criticised for failing to achieve the appropriate 
balance, leaving the Government open to claims of violations of human rights.7 In this 
paper, I examine the diffculties caused by the current system of criminal records 
disclosure for those with old or relatively trivial criminal pasts for whom the system is 
an ever present barrier to their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 
 
Some recently available statistics can be used to illustrate the themes of this research. 
The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS), the body tasked with administering the 
criminal records disclosure system in England and Wales,8 has produced a dataset of 
criminal records certificate disclosures for the year between April 2015 and March 
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2016.9 This information reveals that during the course of the year, 4.214 million DBS 
certificates were issued, of which only 301,893 were ordinary disclosure and 3.912 
million were enhanced disclosure requests. The differences between 'ordinary' and 
'enhanced' disclosure are discussed in more detail in the next section of this paper, but 
it should be noted that the process of 'enhanced' disclosure represents a significantly 
more intrusive examination of the applicant's previous history than 'ordinary' 
disclosure. The total number of certificates issued appears to be generally stable and 
consistent compared with the previous three to four years, but there appears to be a 
disproportionate increase in the number of enhanced certificates applied for than in 
preceding years.10 
 
Of the total number of certificates, both ordinary and enhanced, some 252,419 
disclosed convictions or cautions or some other information recorded against 
applicants on the Police National Intelligence Computer. This represents 
approximately 6% of all certificates issued. It is not possible to discern from these 
statistics how many of the disclosed convictions and cautions would have been 
regarded as ‘spent’, and therefore exempt from disclosure, had the applicant been 
seeking a different job or position. The same statistics also record that there were 1.14 
Million ‘PLX Hits’ during the year. This is the ‘Police Local Cross Referencing 
System’, which locates all data known to the police about an individual applicant, not 
just criminal convictions or cautions. From this number of 'hits', it is interesting to 
note that only 9,692 certificates issued disclosed 'non-conviction' information. This 
would suggest that, although the number of applicants adversely affected by criminal 
records disclosure is relatively low in percentage terms when compared with the 
number of certificates issued, there are still potentially tens of thousands of people 
each year having their right to respect for private life unlawfully violated by the state. 
  
After this introductory section, I will consider the legal framework in which 
disclosure is made. I will then look at how that framework is to be applied to 
decisions to disclose information as interpreted by the courts. The analysis divides 
into two main issues – whether the information should be disclosed at all, and what 
the recipient of the disclosure does with that information. I consider the findings of 
the study on both of these issues in the fourth and fifth sections respectively of this 
paper. Finally, I draw some conclusions from the analysis and suggest some 
resolution of the difficult question of where to draw the balance between protection of 
the public and rehabilitation and reintegration. 
 
I have adopted a mainly qualitative research method for this study, as this enables a 
more in depth analysis of the views and attitudes which underlie the actions of those 
involved in the disclosure system. The research was mainly desk based, analysing 
data from existing literature and previous research, court decisions in relevant case 
law, publicly available documents and records from the police, the DBS, and state and 
professional regulators. The gathered information was subjected to a thematic analysis 
along the lines of the issues identified from the preliminary review of the legislation, 
case law and existing literature. This enabled some conclusions to be drawn and 
recommendations for reform to be made. 
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 Legal Framework 
 
The current legal framework can be found in the combined provisions of the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (ROA) and the Police Act 1997. The ROA 
provides for persons with convictions for criminal offences not to be questioned about 
those offences,11 and not to be under any obligation to disclose the fact of 
conviction,12 once those convictions have become ‘spent’ under the Act.13 Similar 
provisions are made in respect of individuals whose offence was disposed of by way 
of a caution.14 The ROA also provides that individuals who do not disclose spent 
convictions in answer to such a question should not be prejudiced in law by reason of 
their non-disclosure,15 nor is the fact of or failure to disclose a spent conviction 
legitimate grounds for dismissing or excluding an individual from any ‘office, 
profession, occupation or employment’.16   
 
So far, so good one might think from a rehabilitative point of view for those with 
historical convictions or cautions recorded against them. However, the provisions of 
the ROA are subject to a large number of exclusions and modifications, which are 
determined by the Secretary of State.17 The exemptions to the ROA provisions are set 
out in statutory instrument18 and are based on the nature of the occupation applied for 
rather than on the nature of the offence or its disposal. The statutory instrument has 
been amended to add further occupations to the excepted list on no fewer than 
eighteen occasions since inception, the most recent incarnation coming into force on 
10th March 201519.  The initial set of exempt occupations included those that had 
contact with children, however obliquely, but has now expanded to a plethora of other 
employments.20 The exemptions list was described as ‘exceedingly long'21 as long ago 
as 2009, and has become much longer since, now extending to occupations as diverse 
as traffic wardens, actuaries, football stewards, doctor's receptionists, and all jobs 
which may involve the humane killing of animals.22 Applicants for positions which 
fall within this long list of exceptions may be questioned about their criminal records 
and are obliged to disclose all convictions and cautions, even those which are spent, 
regardless of relevance to the position applied for. 
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The Police Act 1997 makes provision for two types of disclosure of criminal records - 
'ordinary' criminal records certificates and enhanced criminal records certificates.23 
For current purposes, the essential framework of the disclosure system covering both 
types of certificate centres on statutory powers granted to the DBS.24 A crucially 
important similarity between the two types of disclosure is that, where the statutory 
criteria are satisfied, the DBS has a mandatory duty to supply the certificate 
containing the applicant’s criminal record details (or certify that there are no such 
details).25 The criteria, although complex in their wording, are not unduly onerous. 
The essential requirements are that the applicant for a criminal records certificate is 
aged over sixteen, pays the prescribed fee,26 has the application counter-signed by a 
'registered person'27 to attest that the certificate is required for the ‘purposes of an 
exempted question’,28 and, in the case of an enhanced certificate only, that the 
exempted question is being asked for ‘a prescribed purpose’.29 Exempted question in 
this context means a question about previous convictions or cautions which is exempt 
from the non-disclosure provisions of the ROA by order of the Secretary of State.30 
The notion of 'prescribed purpose' in these provisions is worthy of closer scrutiny. 
 
A 'prescribed purpose' is defined as one which is prescribed by Regulation 5A of the 
Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002.31 This Regulation provides a 
list of 'purposes', which are directed towards assessing the applicant's 'suitability' to 
hold certain positions or authorisations.32 The various purposes listed in the 
Regulations overlap, but are not co-extensive with, the list of occupations exempted 
from the ROA under the 1975 Order. Indeed, the prescribed purposes are, for the most 
part, not occupation specific, but are categorised by general activities linked to a 
common theme. Two important prescribed purposes are those relating to suitability 
for positions working with children,33 and working with adults.34 In both cases, 
'working with' is very broadly and loosely defined to include any form of contact with 
children or vulnerable adults in any way, regardless of circumstances or remoteness of 
possibility. Working with a particular group for these purposes also encompasses 
provision of health or social care services, even to adults who are not necessarily 
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vulnerable, including transportation of such adults, and covers those whose function is 
to manage or supervise the work of employees providing such services.35 The point is 
that relating disclosure of spent convictions and other criminal records material to a 
'prescribed purpose' opens up the field of persons who may be subject to disclosure, 
even where their connection to that purpose may be tangential. 
 
Where the criteria are met, the DBS is under a mandatory duty to provide a certificate 
disclosing every 'relevant matter', by which is meant all unspent convictions and 
cautions, all spent convictions for which a custodial sentence was imposed, spent 
convictions for more than one offence, and spent convictions and cautions for any one 
of the long list of offences which appear in section 113A(6D) of the Act.36 The list of 
offences for which conviction or caution will always be disclosed irrespective of 
when committed runs to some 14 sub-paragraphs, some of which contain more than 
one offence, and others of which include offences which are identified by list or 
schedule in other legislation, such as the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 
2006.37 In addition to disclosure of convictions and cautions, in the case of an 
'enhanced' certificate', the DBS are obliged to disclose further information which does 
not relate to convictions or cautions.38 In relation to disclosure of this additional 
information, there is some element of discretion, but it is not that of the DBS. The 
information to be disclosed is that which the chief officer of police 'reasonably 
believes to be relevant' for the prescribed purpose and which in the officer's opinion 
'ought to be included in the certificate'.39 The information disclosed under this section 
is the so called 'soft intelligence’,40 that is police records of unsubstantiated or false 
allegations, arrests and interviews with no charges being brought, charges dropped or 
charges upon which the applicant was acquitted. It is disclosure of this type of 
information which has proved to be the most controversial and has spawned the most 
judicial and academic comment.41 It should be emphasised that disclosure of this 
information is mandatory in the hands of the DBS once the chief officer of police has 
exercised discretion in favour of disclosure. 
 
That is not to say that the DBS has no discretion whatsoever when it comes to 
exercising its powers under the Police Act, but any such discretion is confined to 
which type of certificate is issued - ordinary or enhanced. The DBS may treat an 
application for an ordinary certificate as an application for an enhanced certificate, 
and vice versa, so long as the statutory criteria for that level of disclosure are met.42  
 
There are three significant differences between ordinary and enhanced criminal 
records certificates. The first is that for standard disclosure the position which the 
applicant is seeking needs to be one which is an exception to the general rule against 
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asking an ‘exempted question’.43 There is no requirement to consider the purpose for 
which that question is being asked. Enhanced disclosure, however, is only available if 
the applicant’s proposed activity is covered both by the exceptions under the ROA 
Exceptions Order and falls within a prescribed purpose.44 The second difference is 
that standard certificates only disclose convictions and cautions, whereas enhanced 
certificates additionally disclose, at the discretion of the chief of police, the ‘soft 
intelligence’ held by the police about an individual applicant. The third difference is 
the fee payable by the applicant to the DBS for the different levels of certificate.45 
This fee differential provides the DBS with a financial incentive to issue enhanced 
certificates, even where such a level of disclosure may be entirely unnecessary. 
 
The criminal records disclosure system in England and Wales operates within a 
complex framework of two main statutes supplemented by a bewildering array of 
amending statutory instruments and official guidelines. Essentially the regime makes 
disclosure of convictions and cautions mandatory if a former offender is seeking a 
particular job or position. Further non-conviction information must also be disclosed, 
if the police believe it ought to be disclosed, where the ex-offender is seeking a 
particular job where his or her suitability to perform that job has to be assessed 
because of the nature of the position. The numbers of positions and persons affected 
by these disclosure rules is growing. Because of the complexity of the legislative 
scheme, the next section will consider how the regime is applied in practice and in 
particular its impact on the rights of the individuals affected.    
 
Where is the law now? 
 
In November 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in the case of MM v 
United Kingdom, that the criminal record disclosure system in England and Wales, at 
it stood at the time, violated the rights of citizens to respect for their private lives 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and such a violation 
could not be justified as a necessary or proportionate means of achieving the 
legitimate aim of protecting the public. The system was criticised for drawing no 
distinction based on the nature of the offence, the way in which the case was disposed 
of, the time elapsed since commission of the offence, or the relevance of the 
information to the position for which disclosure was sought.46 The disclosure regime 
came under scrutiny again before the domestic courts less than three months later, 
when the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in R(on the application of T) v Chief 
Constable of Greater Manchester Police.47 This now well known case involved two 
individuals, both of whom had received cautions for theft many years prior to their 
applications for enhanced criminal records certificates. The Court of Appeal held that 
the disclosure of criminal records engaged Article 8 because such records, after a 
period of time, became part of an individual’s private life. The claimants’ Article 8 
rights were violated because the system of disclosure ‘failed to strike a fair balance 
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between their rights and the interests of the community’.48 The Court of Appeal issued 
a declaration that the provisions of the Police Act 1997 and the ROA were 
incompatible with Article 8.49 This decision was upheld on the Police Act point by the 
Supreme Court in the subsequent appeal.50 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court 
of Appeal that the criminal record certificate provisions were incompatible with 
Article 8 and the interference with an individual’s private life which they represented 
was not in accordance with the law51 or necessary in a democratic society.  
 
In between the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court decisions, the UK Government, 
no doubt seeing the way in which the wind was blowing, amended the criminal 
records disclosure system by introducing the concept of the 'protected conviction and 
caution'.52 The Supreme Court declined to comment on the changes and based its 
decision exclusively on the pre-amendment regime. The new ‘filtering rules’ provided 
for certain convictions and cautions not to be disclosed on certificates if more than 
eleven years had elapsed since conviction (six years in the case of cautions), it was the 
applicant’s only conviction, it did not result in a custodial sentence, and the offence 
did not appear on a DBS compiled list of offences relevant to safeguarding.53 
Commentators, however, felt that the amendments amounted to no more than 
'tweaking' the original system,54 and the post-amendment regime would be no more 
respectful of human rights than the earlier one. 55 Given the minor nature of changes, 
and the fact that this leaves those with recent but otherwise spent convictions, two 
minor convictions, or a conviction disposed of by a short period of imprisonment, 
vulnerable to disclosure, these comments would appear to be well founded. 
 
The courts have given a mixed reception to the amendments with regard to their 
compatibility with Convention Rights. In W v Secretary of State for Justice,56 the 
High Court held that disclosure of W’s conviction for occasioning actual bodily harm 
at the age of 16, for which he received a two year conditional discharge, was, under 
the amended disclosure regime, prescribed by law and a proportionate means of 
addressing a legitimate aim in a democratic society. W was 47 years of age and of 
otherwise exemplary character when he had applied for an enhanced certificate with a 
view to becoming a teacher of English as a second language. A similar conclusion 
was reached in R(on the application of SD) v Chief Constable of North Yorkshire,57 a 
case which did not involve a criminal conviction but a finding by a disciplinary panel 
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that a teacher had made inappropriate remarks of a sexual nature to an adult student. 
The High Court held that the interference with the teacher’s privacy was justified as it 
came within the scope of Article 8(2). 
 
However, in P v Secretary of State for Justice,58 the claimants had been convicted of 
minor dishonesty offences, and in one case absconding whilst on bail, when aged in 
their late teens. The claimants were concerned that a criminal records certificate 
disclosing these offences may jeopardise their positions as a teaching assistant and a 
finance director respectively. The High Court in this case took the view that the 
amended disclosure system still infringed the claimants’ Article 8 rights and that 
infringement was not according to law.59 Shortly after this decision, another High 
Court judge ruled, in G v Chief Const of Surrey Police,60 that disclosure of reprimands 
(the juvenile equivalent of cautions) received for sexual activity with young boys 
when the applicant was himself still a minor was an unjustified violation of the 
applicant’s Article 8 rights. 
 
The current position of the amended disclosure scheme is, therefore, somewhat 
unclear. This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the fact that most, if not all, of these 
recent decisions are likely to be considered by the appellate courts.61 However, the 
general view seems to be that even the amended disclosure scheme still amounts to an 
unlawful and unjustifiable interference with Article 8 rights.62 In the light of the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal position, the next section looks at the issue of 
whether the criminal record information should be disclosed at all.  
 
Should the Information be Disclosed? 
 
There are two distinct aspects to this question. The first is whether there can be any 
justification for the disclosure of criminal records information where the data is old or 
irrelevant to the position for which the applicant has applied. The analysis of this 
aspect of the question will focus on the disclosure of spent convictions and cautions, 
but will also draw upon some of the available literature, case law and data in respect 
of disclosure of soft intelligence where this illustrates the point being made. The 
second aspect is whether the correct level of disclosure is being sought in all cases 
and whether more use should be made of the standard records certificates. 
 
The sentencing framework in England and Wales is underpinned by a combination of 
what are traditionally seen as utilitarian and limited retributive theories of 
punishment.63 Indeed, the main sentencing statute provides that two of the purposes of 
sentencing, amongst others, are the reform and rehabilitation of the offender64 and the 
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protection of the public.65 Ashworth describes this as ‘pick and mix’ sentencing66 in 
that it is not possible to achieve all those purposes simultaneously and it is necessary 
to favour one over the others. This highlights the potential tension between the rights 
of offenders and public protection that the criminal records disclosure system is 
seeking to relieve. Given the underlying ethos of the criminal justice system, the 
question might be posed whether it is appropriate to continue to penalise offenders by 
disclosing convictions and cautions in the belief that this is justified as it prevents 
harm to the vulnerable. This tends to veer towards a more retributive form of 
punishment, suggesting that the offender deserves continued punishment because it 
serves a wider benefit to the public to do so, without any incentive for the offender 
not to re-offend.67 
 
It is clear beyond doubt that the purpose and policy underpinning and embodied in the 
ROA was a rehabilitative and reformative one.68 The aim of the Act was to permit 
those with criminal records to reintegrate themselves back into useful members of 
society.69 In the original form of the 1975 Order, the number of exceptions to the non-
disclosure provisions of the Act was quite small. It was only over the intervening 
years that more and more occupations have been added. It was around the time of the 
passing of the ROA that it has been said that rehabilitative theories of sentencing were 
on the wane, only to undergo something of a revival in the past twenty-five years or 
so.70 It is contended that the most influential approach towards rehabilitation of 
offenders over the last twenty years is one of risk management.71 Although this 
approach has had its critics over the years, mostly on the grounds of lack of empirical 
support and a tendency to focus on offence based dispositions rather than the broader 
social and cultural context,72 more nuanced versions of the risk management approach 
based on the importance of community in helping offenders desist are now very much 
to the fore.73 Rehabilitative theories of punishment have been reinvented as a move 
towards risk management and re-branding in terms of resettlement and desistence.74 
 
By contrast, the disclosure regime created by the Police Act 1997 seems to embody a 
much more retributive approach to punishment. It creates a scheme whereby the 
majority of offenders seeking certain positions are permanently stigmatised by the 
actual or potential sharing of criminal information about them with those who have 
the power to refuse entry to that position.75 The Government’s own review of the 
regime claims to start from the principle that it is the criminal justice system which 
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provides suitable punishment for offences and, having served their punishment, 
offenders have the right to re-enter society and have a normal life.76 However, this 
position does not sit easily with the provisions of the Police Act. There has been a 
recognition that cultural barriers may exist to respecting the rights of offenders when 
it comes to protection of the public.77 It is widely recognised that a significant factor 
in rehabilitating offenders is the ability to find and retain a job, and the permanent 
‘branding’ of offenders is a major obstacle to their rehabilitation and reintegration.78 
In addition, there is a growing body of research which suggests that after a certain 
period of non-offending, criminal records are of little predictive value as to future 
offending.79 
 
It is against this background that I consider the question of whether spent convictions, 
cautions and non-conviction data should be disclosed at all. In the case of convictions 
and cautions, an easy answer is that disclosure is mandatory under the Act, and so 
convictions and cautions must be disclosed in order to protect the public. This still 
does not answer the question, however, of why convictions and cautions are disclosed 
where they are very old, or have no relevance to the position applied for, or are so old 
as to be of no probative value is assessing the risk posed to the public by the 
applicant. Although not the main focus of this paper, it is instructive to examine how 
the police exercise their discretion to disclose soft intelligence. This sheds some light 
on whether it would be more appropriate for disclosure of all criminal records 
information to be discretionary rather than mandatory based on a test of relevance and 
the risk to the public posed by the applicant. 
 
When chief police officers are asked to consider disclosure of soft intelligence 
information, they are required to perform a ‘two-stage’ test – is the information 
relevant to the purpose for which disclosure is sought? If so, ‘ought’ the information 
be disclosed.80 In practice, the police make the decision to disclose by following the 
combined guidance of the ‘Statutory Disclosure Guidance’81 and the ‘Quality 
Assurance Framework’. The guidance contains some assistance in interpreting the 
question of what is relevant and when ‘ought’ the information be disclosed, amongst 
the principles of disclosure. Relevant is said to be given its ordinary meaning of 
pertinent to, connected with or bearing upon the subject in question. The decision 
about whether the information ought to be disclosed is said to include consideration of 
the impact of disclosure on the applicant’s job and private life, but no further 
guidance than that is offered.  
 
In evaluating how closely the chief officers follow these guidelines on the question of 
relevance, the starting point could be the facts of the leading case itself.82 Although 
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this was a case involving cautions, and so disclosure was mandatory, had disclosure 
been discretionary, the question might be asked what the relevance was of theft of 
bicycles and false fingernails to positions in teaching and the care industry. In the post 
R(T) era, a number of other examples may be given of disclosures which appear to 
have little relevance to the position applied for. What risk, for example, would be run 
by employing a care worker with historical offences of failing to wear a seatbelt and 
failing to ensure her children did so at a residential home for the elderly?83 Another 
example is the case of an applicant for a job in the healthcare industry with thirty-
three years old convictions for drink driving and taking without the owner’s consent.84 
It may be unfair to pose such questions hypothetically, given that they involve 
convictions and so are disclosable regardless of relevance. There are, however, other 
examples which illustrate the point with regard to the disclosure of soft intelligence 
too. For example, an applicant for a taxi driver’s licence was turned down when his 
certificate revealed that he was awaiting trial on charges of ‘fly-tipping’.85 The same 
committee also refused a licence to an applicant whose otherwise clear certificate 
disclosed an arrest on suspicion of abduction of fourteen year old girl, fourteen years 
earlier, in the context of a family dispute, where the subsequent charge was dropped 
before trial.86 
 
What the officers making the decision whether to disclose, and the Statutory 
Guidance itself, seem to overlook is the requirement of the Act that the relevance has 
to be to the ‘prescribed purpose’. In other words there has to be some connection 
between the information disclosed and the applicant’s suitability for the position, 
rather than just some vague or remote connection between the offence and the 
occupation. What the police appear to be asking themselves is whether there is some 
connection between the information being considered for disclosure and working, in 
the broadest possible sense, with children, vulnerable adults, holding a firearms 
licence and so on, without any regard to the likelihood of that connection ever 
existing in reality. The police officers responsible for disclosure do not appear to 
appreciate this subtle but crucial difference between linking an offence to a job and 
linking an offence to an applicant’s suitability for that job.       
  
Even where it is possible to see a relevant connection between the offence and the 
applicant’s suitability for the position, there is still the second part of the test to 
overcome – whether the information ought to be disclosed. In this area too there are 
many examples where the decision to disclose is questionable. For example, whilst 
there is an obvious relevance to an applicant for a taxi driver’s licence previous 
convictions for motoring and unlawful plying for hire offences, was it really 
necessary to disclose these when they occurred more than eight years previously?87 In 
a case involving convictions for public order offences which were committed between 
twenty-one and fifteen years before an application for a taxi driver’s licence was 
made, making a case for relevance is a stretch; an argument as to why this ought to 
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have been disclosed is difficult to see. A similar example may be seen in relation to a 
soft intelligence disclosure case, where an applicant acquitted of a charge of rape of a 
seventeen year old female had this fact disclosed on his certificate in relation to an 
application for a teaching position.88     
  
It appears from the case law and regulatory data examples that when deciding whether 
soft intelligence ought to be disclosed, chief officers are still basing their decisions on 
the now defunct test of whether the allegation ‘might be true’, notwithstanding the 
absence of further action, the withdrawal of charges or the acquittal of the accused.89 
It is highly unsatisfactory to let police re-try the case of an acquitted defendant and 
decide that he did commit the offence after all. Of course the police will generally 
believe the allegations to be true, especially where an accused has been charged or 
tried. It is unsafe and unsatisfactory where individual rights are in issue to enable the 
police to re-assess the evidence in their own minds and decide that the allegations are 
true after all. This leads to the conclusion that the chief police officers are not the 
appropriate people to exercise the discretion necessary in such cases.  
 
The other aspect of this question of whether information ought to be disclosed is 
whether the right levels of disclosure are being sought in all cases. Even as long ago 
as 2003, the Government itself pointed out that the number of Enhanced Disclosures 
outnumbered Standard Disclosures by ten to one.90 Pijoan points out that, in practice, 
the enhanced certificate is the one that most employers apply for, probably because it 
is not simple to weed out the positions for which a standard certificate is required.91 
This is true, but a simpler explanation might be that it is all too easy to bring a 
position within the ambit of s 113B by some link, no matter how tenuous, to a 
prescribed purpose and a prospective employer will want to know the ‘full story’ 
about who they propose to take on as employee. There is no sanction provided for 
seeking the wrong level of disclosure. Any ‘registered’ person can seek enhanced 
disclosure as long as they certify that the ‘exempted’ question is likely to be asked for 
a ‘prescribed purpose’ under s 113B, and they pay the higher fee. Mason 
recommended that there be periodical reviews of the ‘registered bodies’ to ensure that 
they were adhering to their obligations with regard to the correct level of checks, with 
persistent offenders facing de-registration.92 This recommendation was not taken up, 
but a revised Code of Practice from the DBS firmly places the burden on the counter-
signing officer of the registered body to satisfy himself or herself that the person 
against whom disclosure is sought is eligible for that level of check under the Act.93 
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Although I have adopted a largely qualitative approach to this study, the recent 
statistics to which I referred in the introductory section,94 formed part of the analysis 
of the issue of whether proper use is being made of the disclosure system. The DBS 
statistics indicate that, in the year April 2015 to March 2016, for every application for 
an ordinary criminal records certificate there were almost thirteen applications for 
enhanced certificates.95 This shows a marked increase in the proportion of enhanced 
certificates being sought since the time of the Home Office’s own review of the 
working of the ROA some twelve years earlier.96 Such an increase would tend to 
suggest that more applicants, at the request of prospective employers, are bringing the 
job that they hope to do within the ambit of a ‘prescribed purpose’ under the 2002 
Regulations.97 On the basis of the number of ‘PLX Hits’,98 it would appear that 
around 2.8 million applications could have been dealt with by an ordinary certificate, 
as there was nothing to disclose by way of convictions, cautions or soft intelligence. 
This overzealous and unnecessary use of the enhanced disclosure procedure, however, 
appears to be continuing unabated by the DBS. 
 
In terms of the number of applications overall, the figures appear to have remained 
relatively stable and consistent over a number of years.99 Intuitively this seems to be 
unexpected, given that during this period the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
delivered their judgments in R(T)100 and Parliament introduced an amended disclosure 
system. However, there does not appear to be any ‘R(T) effect’ in terms of a reduction 
in the number of certificates being sought, although, on further reflection, this is 
probably no surprise given the very minor nature of the amendment which followed 
that decision. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that, whilst mandatory disclosure of 
unspent convictions is unobjectionable, disclosure of spent convictions and cautions 
should not be mandatory but be discretionary. However, that discretion should not be 
that of the police. The DBS should be able to exercise this discretion on behalf of the 
applicant, possibly in consultation with the applicant themselves before disclosure is 
made to the prospective employer or regulator.101 A procedural requirement of 
consultation before disclosure has been championed by Munby LJ in two cases. In 
R(H) v A City Council 102, the local authority had disclosed H’s conviction for 
indecent assault upon a child to charitable organisations and public bodies with which 
H was involved. The Court of Appeal held that the principles which applied to the 
statutory disclosure scheme outlined in R(L)103 also applied in this non-statutory 
context, and the Council failed to engage with the crucial point that H did not work 
with children. The local authority’s blanket policy of disclosure was, therefore, 
substantively unlawful both at common law and as a violation of H’s Article 8 rights. 
The Court of Appeal also introduced the notion that both the common law and Article 
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8 demanded procedural fairness, which, in this case, required that ‘the local authority 
must consult with [the claimants] and given them a proper opportunity to make their 
objections to what was proposed, after the local authority has decided what disclosure 
to make, and to whom, and before it does so.’104 The failure to consult in this case was 
described as an ‘egregious’ procedural shortcoming ‘which vitiated the entire 
process.’105 
 
A requirement of consultation in order to satisfy the demands of procedural fairness 
was highlighted in R(B) v Chief Constable of Derbyshire,106 where Munby LJ again 
made it clear that, in his view, ‘compliance with the procedural requirements of 
Article 8 requires that the claimant be given adequate opportunity to make 
representations before any ECRC was issued. He ought to have been sent a draft of 
the Certificate …He was not; so there was, in my judgment, a breach of Article 8.’107 
However, the claimant’s attempt in this case to extend ‘consultation’ to wide-ranging 
disclosure of all the information upon which the Chief Constable had based his 
decision was decisively rejected by the Court. The significance of consultation was 
taken a stage further in Re JR59’s Application for Judicial Review,108 where the Court 
ruled that it was a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights if, 
having made representations which failed to dissuade the chief constable from the 
decision to disclose, the applicant was not given the opportunity to withdraw his 
application for a certificate before the disclosure was made to the prospective 
employer. 
  
On the basis of the findings of this study, the police are generally reluctant to change 
their decision to disclose soft intelligence once that decision has been taken, even 
after consultation with the applicant. It is difficult to discern from the data available 
the number of disclosures where consultation took place, what that consultation 
consisted of, and whether this made any difference to the decision to disclose. It is 
worthy of note that in R(T) itself, one of the applicants received an ‘amended 
certificate’, which still disclosed the caution but included some additional 
information, following representations by the applicant’s solicitor.109 Other evidence 
of the impact of a duty to consult is largely anecdotal and would have to be the 
subject of a more in depth study. 
 
The suggestion that some element of discretion should be introduced into the 
disclosure of convictions and cautions was not accepted by the Court in W v Secretary 
of State for Justice110 as being neither practical nor sufficiently certain. However, this 
is not necessarily the case. The DBS already has discretionary powers to ensure the 
correct level of disclosure is being applied for, even though, on the evidence of this 
study, it does not use those powers. Even if there are concerns about certainty and 
practicability of such a suggestion, it cannot be any more unreliable and uncertain 
than the rather arbitrary system of police discretion which currently exists. The 
question of disclosure of all forms of criminal records, whether conviction or soft 
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intelligence, should be based on an assessment of the risk presented by an individual 
to vulnerable members of the public to whom that information may suggest the 
applicant may be a threat. The DBS are in a more independent and objective position 
to exercise such discretion than the police under the current system. 
 
Use of Disclosed Information 
 
In the penultimate section of this paper, I consider the other side of the disclosure 
regime – the organisation that receives the disclosed information from the DBS. What 
do these organisations, which are usually employers or state appointed regulators, do 
with the criminal records information which they receive? Technically, of course, it is 
the applicant for a particular position who seeks the criminal records certificate, but 
such a request is normally made at the insistence of the individual or body having the 
power to decide whether the applicant is appointed to the position they seek. This 
body or individual is the ‘registered body’ required to countersign the application, and 
which normally receives a copy of the certificate sent to the applicant.  
 
The involvement of this registered body has been used as a means by which chief 
police officers seek to absolve themselves of responsibility for the consequences of 
their decisions to disclose soft intelligence. The police may argue that they are simply 
providing the information. What the prospective employer or regulator does with that 
information is beyond the control of the police and the DBS. Indeed, in some of the 
cases challenging officer’s decisions to disclose, one of the arguments against the 
allegation of a violation of Article 8 rights was that disclosure did not prevent the 
applicant from obtaining a job, only that particular position for which they had 
applied. This argument was accorded significant weight in the lower courts in some 
cases,111 but the courts now generally accept that an applicant’s rights to privacy 
extends to his choice of occupation and disclosure amounts to ‘something close to a 
killer blow to the hopes of a person who aspires to any post’.112  
 
It is only to be expected that a potential employer or regulator for particular 
occupations will want to know the ‘full story’ so far as the previous criminal history 
of a prospective employee or licence holder is concerned.113 Recent research by 
Appleton found that 37% of withdrawn job offers were based on non-conviction 
information,114 although there is no report of how many were withdrawn after 
disclosure of conviction records or cautions. Some employers will take the view that 
as the police have taken the trouble to mention it on the certificate, it must be 
important and so the employer must act on it too, with no thought as to whether the 
information is relevant to the position or ought to have been disclosed. Older research 
by Fletcher et al, suggests that 56% of public sector employers have ‘anxieties’ over 
employing anyone with any form of criminal record, largely as a result of stereotyped 
attitudes of ‘once an offender always an offender’ or anger about certain types of 
offence rather than concerns about the risk of re-offending.115 This is still reflected in 
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the fact that many employers will only offer a position to an applicant with a ‘clean’ 
DBS certificate. In R(Pinnington) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley116 Richards J 
said that he was ‘troubled by the employer’s insistence on a completely clean 
certificate’.117 
 
Employers and regulators are, however, performing and different function and 
exercising different powers than those responsible for the disclosure of criminal 
records. Private sector employers are, of course, free to make what they will of the 
disclosed information and, so long as they do not discriminate on the grounds of any 
of the ‘protected characteristics’ contained in the Equality Act 2010,118 they may 
appoint or refuse to appoint the applicant to the post as they see fit. Those in the 
public sector, however, are in a different position, and this includes the vast majority 
of state or professional regulators. The difference is that these employers or regulators 
are ‘public bodies’ and so are obliged to exercise their powers lawfully within the 
bounds of the powers granted to them by Parliament, and are susceptible to judicial 
review of the exercise of their powers. 
 
Local authorities and other public employers and regulators unequivocally state that 
they exercise their regulatory powers for the ‘protection of the public’. Promoting the 
‘public interest’ is seen by some commentators as the whole reason for economic 
regulation of any business or commercial activity.119 Although the concept of what is 
meant by ‘the public interest’ is difficult to define,120 there is no doubt that the notion 
of protecting the public or acting in the public interest heavily influences the shaping 
of regulation generally.121 Local authority and other public regulators often appear in 
their rhetoric to attempt to tread an uncertain line between a retributive view of 
punishment with the protection of the public taking precedence, whilst still respecting 
the human rights of those individuals seeking positions over which those regulators 
have control.  
 
It must be emphasised, however, that, although regulators are exercising statutory 
powers, those powers are often couched in wide discretionary terms. This means that 
the registered bodies who seek criminal records certificates have much more 
flexibility over how they treat and use the information they receive about an 
individual. In most cases, the regulator has to determine whether the disclosed 
information impacts on the applicant’s ‘suitability’ or ‘fitness’ to be appointed to the 
post applied for. There are some limits to the exercise of this discretion. Public 
regulators must exercise their discretion for the purposes for which it was granted,122 
must exercise their discretion rationally,123 and, where Convention Rights are in issue, 
must act proportionally and in a way which gives effect to those rights.124 In practice, 
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local authority and other regulators structure the exercise of their discretion in 
accordance with published policies.  
 
Of the 337 local councils in England and Wales responsible for various regulatory 
matters for which criminal records certificates are available, all of them had some 
form of ‘Conviction Policy’.125 These policies are designed to guide the exercise of 
local authority regulators’ discretion in cases where DBS checks reveal convictions 
and cautions, spent or otherwise in the case of excepted occupations under the 1975 
Order. The point should be made that no council has a policy in relation to how to 
deal with disclosed soft intelligence, so the effect of such information on a local 
authority regulator is even more fluid than in the case of convictions and cautions. 
However, councils do have policies to deal with cases where criminal records 
certificates reveal convictions and cautions. There are, however, two problems 
revealed by these policies. First, they are all, to some degree or other, based on now 
very old Government Circulars from 1992.126 Second, in the absence of more specific 
guidance from central government, every council has created its own policy and every 
policy is different. 
 
Approx two-thirds of Councils from which it was possible to obtain information have 
updated their conviction policies since inception of the DBS. This update was not 
necessarily because of the inception, but some amendments reflect the fact that the 
DBS and not the CRB now issue certificates. There are very few councils that make 
any substantial amendments to take account of the human rights concerns expressed 
by the Court in R(T).127 None of them make specific reference to the T case or the 
subsequent amendments to the disclosure regime. This should be no real surprise as 
local authority regulators are notoriously reluctant to change and apply new policies, 
even when they have one.128  
 
The local authority ‘Conviction Policies’ generally impose a blanket ban on the grant 
of a licence or issue of a permission for most serious offences, such as murder, 
manslaughter, rape, or terrorism. This reflects the fact that some offences rule out 
consideration for most positions where there is likely to be face to face contact with 
the public.129 For other cases, regulators usually apply different sliding scales, which 
vary as a combination of the nature of the offence and the time which has elapsed 
since completion of the sentence, rather than date of offence or conviction. The more 
serious the offence, the longer needs to have elapsed since completion of the sentence 
before the applicant will be considered eligible for a position. The ‘clean’ period 
which needs to elapse before consideration is given to an applicant can vary between 
two and twelve years depending on offence and council. 
 
Because all councils employ different policies and different criteria when determining 
whether applicants should be permitted entry to certain positions, this can lead to 
different outcomes being experienced in similar cases in different locations. Although 
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all councils claim that they will consider factors such as the nature of the offence, 
when the offence was committed, the date of conviction, the age of applicant at time 
of offence, and any other relevant factors, the weight given to such factors appear to 
vary from council to council, leading to inconsistency. For example, an applicant for a 
taxi licence with a history of a solitary suspended sentence twenty-one years ago for 
possession of cannabis and amphetamines was refused a licence,130 whereas, at a 
different council an applicant with a five year old conviction for solicitation was 
granted a licence.131 At another council, an applicant with a conviction for affray 
when involved in a fight between groups of teenagers thirteen years earlier was also 
refused a licence.132  
 
Although the examples considered here are not identical situations, they do reflect the 
differing approaches and inconsistency that can and does arise when local authority 
regulators are left to design and implement their own policies in the absence of 
statutory or other guidance. The findings of this study suggest that it is the nature of 
the offence that is the prominent consideration and not some of the other factors 
which councils claim to take into account. It was particularly noticeable how many 
outcomes depended on the length of time that applicant was ‘conviction free’ rather 
than how long ago the offence was committed or the applicant’s age at the time of the 
offence. There appeared to be a complete absence of human rights considerations, 
such as the individual’s right to respect for his or her privacy or requirement to 




The law in this important area is still not in a settled state, and it is unclear what the 
present position is in view of conflicting authorities and potential for change as a 
result of appeals to the higher courts. However, the predominant view is that the 
amended disclosure regime still represents an unjustifiable infringement of Article 8 
ECHR rights. The amendment was token and ineffective and only likely to affect the 
position of a very small number of people, namely those with only one very minor 
conviction. It brought no relief to the much larger group of offenders who have lived 
conviction free for many years but are still finding it difficult to reintegrate 
themselves fully back into society. 
 
The DBS should play a much more active role in the disclosure process, rather than 
simply act as a conduit for information, which it is bound to disclose regardless of its 
view of the relevance or purpose of disclosure. The disclosure of spent convictions 
and cautions should be discretionary on same basis as ‘soft intelligence’ currently is, 
but not at the discretion of Police, whose exercise of their present powers is seen as 
unreliable and arbitrary, but by the DBS itself. Safeguards can be built into the system 
to address concerns about legal certainty. But the starting point should be, as was 
suggested by Liberty, acting as Intervener in R(T), that the point at which a  
conviction or caution becomes spent is the point at which it recedes into the past and 
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becomes part of one’s private life.133 From that starting point, the structure of 
discretion of both the‘discloser’ and the ‘recipient’ of the criminal record information 
must be based on the assessment of the risk posed by the applicant to any potential 
vulnerable person with whom they are likely to interact, not the nature of their offence 
alone. 
 
The fact that local authority regulators have their own conviction policies 
demonstrates that it is possible to have a ‘job specific’ set of standards or guidelines 
to control or structure the exercise of discretion. Statutory or non-statutory guidelines 
to structure and control discretion on the basis of risk should counter any objections 
that having to make disclosure decisions on a case by case basis makes the law 
unworkable or uncertain. The difficulty councils in practice experience with their own 
policies is as a result of inconsistency of approach and implementation rather than an 
inherent fault in the policy.  
 
As was said by Fenton, in an entirely different context, ‘It may be…we are still a long 
way from the necessary and explicit acknowledgment that the human rights of the 
offender are as essential a consideration as risk assessment and public protection’.134     
The decisive factor in both respecting an individual’s rights and protecting the public 
should be the relevance of criminal records information to that individual’s suitability 
to fulfil that role based on the risk presented by that individual, not by a tenuous link 
to the nature of the offence, which may be irrelevant or so old as to fade into the 
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